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I. INTRODUCTION
There are countless Katrina-law problems. This Article explores
one such problem: the plight of poor, unrepresented, and uncharged
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Criminal Law Clinic, Tulane
University School of Law. My thanks to the Tulane Law Review, which hosted the
Symposium at which this Article was presented, and to my colleagues who believed-they
already know who they are.
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prisoners. Drawing heavily on my own experiences representing those
detainees, this Article attempts to explain why these detainees were
unrepresented and abandoned. This Article also reimagines how we
might better guarantee the quality of justice for future detainees. The
Article concludes with some reflections about criminal justice
lawyering after Katrina.
II. KATRINA TIME
When Hurricane Katrina swept across New Orleans, over 6500
men, women, and children were locked in the sprawling Orleans Parish
Prison (OPP) complex.' Forty-eight hours before Katrina made
landfall, prison officials cut inmate phone lines, and the inmates lost
all contact with the outside world.2 As the storm grew closer, police
continued to arrest suspects: some for serious crimes, like murder and
rape; others for petty offenses, like trespass and public intoxication.'
Meanwhile, the prisoners' families either packed and fled or stayed
and watched the water rise.
Within days, OPP had evacuated all of its inmates to state and
parish jails and prisons across the State of Louisiana.! The evacuated
prisoners were taken from OPP without any of their legal documents,
personal papers, or meaningful identification.5 Once evacuated, the
OPP prisoners were lost to the known world, just as surely as if they
had been among the "disappeared" of a country struggling under a
repressive dictatorship.
When Katrina hit, the Orleans Indigent Defender Program did
not have a list of its imprisoned clients, much less information about
those prisoners' family contacts or medical needs. Still, some of those
prisoners had pending and active court cases; their names appeared on
1. Statistics provided by the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff's office indicate that,
on August 28, 2005, OPP held nearly 6700 prisoners. NAT'L PRISON PROJECT OF THE ACLU
ET AL., ABANDONED AND ABUSED: ORLEANS PARISH PRISONERS IN THE WAKE OF HURRICANE
KATRINA 9-13 (2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/prison/oppreport2006O8O9.pdf
[hereinafter NAT'L PRISON PROJECT ET AL.]. In addition, OPP was housing several hundred
inmates from neighboring parishes; those parishes had evacuated their inmates to the
perceived safety of OPP's facilities. Id. For one account of the evacuation and its aftermath,
see Brandon L. Garrett & Tania Tetlow, Criminal Justce Collapse: The Constitution Alter
Hurricane Katrina 56 DUKE L.J. 127, 134-42 (2006) (describing the plight of OPP's
population and the New Orleans criminal justice system's response following Hurricane
Katrina).
2. NAT'L PRISON PROJECT ET AL., supra note 1, at 29.
3. Human Rights Watch, New Orleans: Prisoners Abandoned to Floodwater, HuM.
RTS. NEWS, Sept. 22, 2005, http://hrw.org/english/doc/2005/09/22/usdom 11773.htm.
4. Id. at 139.
5. Id. at 148.
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court dockets and in prosecutors' case files, and their cases would
eventually be tracked by the larger criminal justice system. Other OPP
prisoners had private counsel, counsel who knew their names, knew
their families and knew their plight. But one group of prisoners
vanished almost entirely. Those prisoners were uncharged,
unrepresented detainees. As poor people who had been arrested, but
not yet formally charged, these prisoners had no public defender.6
True, a public defender had "stood up" for each of these detainee's
initial appearance, but that appearance was a cameo, a systemic sleight
of hand that put a fig leaf over the naked abandonment of poor pretrial
detainees. Even before Katrina, poor precharge detainees had
languished in jail for weeks in a kind of jurisprudential limbo: not
charged but not free. After Katrina, poor precharge detainees
descended into a Kafka-esque hell: not charged, not free, not known.
A. Filling the Breach: My Own Journey
I knew little of the prisoners' plight when I fled New Orleans.
When Katrina came, I packed for my family: children's clothes and
blankies, favorite toys, books, photo albums, quilts, the dog and her
worn-out bed. I packed for my law clinic and our clients: case lists,
case files, code books, zip drives, and electronic copies of case
memoranda and briefs.
Like most of my friends and colleagues, I watched, with growing
dread, as televisions and Web sites showed shocking images: prisoners
sitting broiling in the sun on the 1-10 overpass; the grey stone walls of
the criminal court house overtaken by murky waters; judges, clerks,
guards, lawyers, and prisoners rowing to safety in small boats. I heard
wild rumors: a prison riot, a prison massacre. I joined criminal
defense list serves and absorbed the dribs and drabs of news that
floated back to us: the criminal court evidence room had flooded, and
case evidence had dissolved into unrecognizable sodden piles;' the
Greyhound Bus Station had been converted to a jail and courthouse;
human rights' groups were recruiting volunteers to interview prisoners
and catalogue detainees' names, charges, and locations.
At the Tulane Criminal Law Clinic, we functioned as best we
could. We looked for our clients on Red Cross lists and evacuee
postings. We contacted the family members of our incarcerated clients
6. See Leslie Eaton, Judge Steps in for Poor Inmates Without Justice Since
Hurricane, N.Y. TIMEs, May 23, 2006, at Al.
7. Garrett & Tetlow, supranote 1, at 138, 146.
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and confirmed their whereabouts. Within a month of our evacuation,
we were satisfied that we had done all we could to guarantee our
clients' safety.
A small band of lawyers traveled across Louisiana to locate the
Orleans Parish prisoners and to advocate for the release of those
imprisoned for minor offenses.8 I did not. I rented a house and settled
my children in school in Atlanta. Another group of lawyers filed
habeas petitions for thousands of prisoners who had no access to the
court and no identifiable future court date.9 I did not. I drafted a
Supreme Court petition for certiorari on a Confrontation Clause issue
and waited to see when Orleans Parish criminal practice would
resume.
Two months after Katrina, in October 2005, Chief Judge Calvin
Johnson of the Orleans Parish Criminal Court called me to duty. Judge
Johnson appointed my clinic, the Tulane Criminal Law Clinic, and the
Loyola Criminal Law Clinic to represent all indigent pretrial detainees
who were charged with crimes in Orleans Parish on claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.'" Thus began my acquaintance with
the unknown Katrina prisoners.
For the next several months, my colleagues and I struggled to
make sense of our new calling. Who were our clients? How many
clients did we have? How could we find them? How could we see
them? When Tulane University School of Law reopened in January
2006," the Criminal Law Clinic had two kinds of cases: "old" (pre-
Katrina) clients and new clients. The trouble was, we still did not
know who all of our new clients were.
In February, our clinic began making weekly trips to remote
parish prisons to interview and triage Orleans Parish pretrial detainees.
Much to our surprise, a significant percentage of the detainees were
illegally detained, held long past their lawful release dates. We had
been confident that those early rounds of heroic lawyering had
successfully weeded out those charged with minor offenses, yet more
than ten percent of interviewed detainees were released after we
8. See David Rohde & Christopher Drew, The Inmates: PRisoners EvacuatedAfter
HurricanesAllegeAbuse, N.Y TIMEs, Oct. 2,2005, (National), at 26.
9. See Henry Weinstein, Evacuated Pnsoners Are Captive to Legal Limbo, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, atA26.
10. Madeline Vann, Clinic Battles for Rights of Indigent PRisoners, Tul. Law.,
Spring/Summer 2006, at 19, 19.
11. Press Release, Tulane Univ. Sch. of Law, A Message from the Dean (Dec. 13,
2005) (available at http://www.law.tulane.edu/resources/index.cfm?d=tlsnews&main-inthenews.
cfn&newsid= 182&t=r).
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showed the court and the prosecution the undisputed court records:
those inmates had already been incarcerated beyond the maximum
time permitted by law. We were stunned to discover "new" prisoners-
evacuees whose names did not appear on the prisoner rolls cobbled
together by court officials, volunteer lawyers, prosecutors, and prison
officials. How could it be that nearly seven months after Katrina,
Louisiana jails housed prisoners so completely forgotten that no one
even knew that they were in prison? We renewed our efforts to
develop the most basic facts: who was in jail, and why?
And, we remained bewildered by the questions we had to ask.
How were these people lost? No one knew. Why had they stayed lost,
so many months after Katrina? No one could explain. Who
represented them? No one.
In March 2006, the judges of the Orleans Parish Criminal District
Court appointed me to serve as a member of the new reform board of
the Orleans Public Defender.'" Meanwhile, under the auspices of the
Student Hurricane Network's "Project Triage," nearly fifty law
students from around the country gave up their spring breaks and paid
their own way to New Orleans to sit with us in front of computer
screens searching criminal justice databases to sort out the detainees
most in need of immediate release." By April 2006, our clinic had
become the unofficial point institution for the location and release of
the Orleans Parish criminal justice community's lost detainees.
Our personal, anecdotal experiences were so shocking that we
could hardly credit them. Yet our evolving empirical data reflected the
same larger trend. For example, between mid-June and mid-July of
2006, the Tulane Law Clinic generated a list of 379 detainees who had
not been to court even once since Katrina made landfall. Nearly three
dozen of these detainees were entitled to immediate release. More
than one hundred others were in desperate need of immediate legal
assistance.
I have long since lost count of the number of detainees who have
been released because of work done by our law clinic. As I write this,
in February 2007, my students and I have spent sixteen months
combing through lists of pretrial detainees, looking for those
uncharged, unrepresented, and overdetained people; those who are
literally unnamed and unknown; those who are lost but who need only
12. Eaton, supra note 6.
13. Id.
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one lawyer, one phone call, or one court date to have the prison doors
swing open."
When Katrina came, I did not pack for these things. I would not
have known how.
B. Lost in the Gap. Gregory Davis
On Apul 16, 2005, Gregory Daws was arrested and charged with
possession of prohibited drug paraphernalia.'5  The charge is a
misdemeanor that caries a maximum sentence of six months of
incarcemon.'6  Within seventy-two hours of his arrest, Mr Davis
appeared in court, along with more than three dozen other arrestees,
for an imtal appearance and bond setting.'7 They sat in the courtroom
as a single public defender, assigned to the magiszate section of
court, addressed the group. The public defender explained he was
representing all of the detainees, but for today only He gave a brief
speech that went, more or less, like this:
Today, you are here for an im'tal appearance. The judge will set your
bond and I will represent you for that purpose. I am not representing
you on your case. Nevertheless, Ido have some advice and information
for you.
First, today the prosecutor will tell the judge your criminal history-
the number of felony and misdemeanor arrests and the number of
felony and misdemeanor convictions. Based upon that information and
14. In September 2006, the Tulane Law Criminal Clinic joined the Student Hurricane
Network and the Orleans Public Defenders in an ambitious project designed to create
meaningful client files for the hundreds of detainees who had been arrested before, and in the
months after, Katrina-months when there were no functioning courts, jails, or public
defender offices. This project, known as the Katrina-Gideon Interview Project, began with an
inventory of the nearly 3000 people who were in the custody of the Orleans Parish Criminal
Sheriff on September 8, 2006. STUDENT HURRICANE NETwORK, LAW STUDENTS WORKING
WmTHIN THE POST-KATRINA LEGAL LANDSCAPE: THE STUDENT HURRICANE NETWORK ANNUAL
REPORT 10 (Laila Hlass et al. eds., 2006), available at http://www.studenthurricanenetwork.
org/shn-report oct_%202006.pdf; see Laura Maggi, Group Tries To Loosen Legal Logjam:
Students To Gather Case Information, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 16, 2006, at B-
1; Ann M. Simmons, Justice on Katina Time, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 12, 2006, at Al. In
December 2006, the Katrina-Gideon Interview Project launched its first volunteer effort,
consisting of remote data entry and case evaluations by students and law professors around
the country. Maggi, supa. Within one week, project volunteers identified five detainees who
were entitled to immediate release and several others who had not been to court since before
Katrina's landfall. By the end of January 2007, nearly 250 lawyer and law student volunteers
had traveled to Louisiana to interview indigent clients and build client files, enabling public
defenders to provide meaningful and effective advocacy. See id.
15. First Appearance, State v. Davis, Magis. No. 454-073 (La. Magis. Ct. Orleans
Parish Apr. 16, 2005).
16. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1023(C), : 1025 (2007).
17. First Appearance, supm note 15.
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upon the information contained in the charge, the judge will set your
bond. Ihave a copy of the ' ist" that descibes the charges against you.
if there is an argument to be made that the police haven't properly
charged you, I will make that argument on your behalf
Secon4 other than any questions the judge or I may have for you, I
advise you not to say anything about your case today or to anyone else
in the future except your attorney
Thur you are here because the police have arrested you for
committing a cime. However, the district attomey office has not
decided whether to accept the case forprosecution. Ifyou do not make
bond and you are charged with a misdemeanor, the &sftrct attorney will
have forty-five days to decide whether to accept the prosecution of the
case; if you are charged with a felony, the prosecutor has 60 days to
decide whether to prosecute your case. If the district attorney accepts
your case, your case will be allotted to a section of court, the judge in
that section of court will set your case for an armignment within 30
days. At your araignment, the court will detemine whether you are
indigent and qualify for a court-appointed attorney Ifyou do qualify
fora public defender, your lawyer will be appointed for you then.
The court found probable cause to believe that Mr Davis had
committed the charged crime. The court set bond at $2500 and set
the case on its calendar for May 31, 2005, forty-five days later, for a
rule-to-show-cause hearing.9  If, by May 31, 2005, the district
attorneyl office had not accepted the charges, the court would order




On May 20, 2005, the district attorney office filed a bill of
information accepting the charges." The case was set for arraignment
on June 6, 2005.3 On that date, the court appointed a public defender
to represent M Davis. 4 The court set the trial for two weeks later, on
June 28, 20055 Thus, afier nearly two months without counsel, Mr.
Davis was ordered to proceed to tral with a lawyer who would have
represented him for less than three weeks.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. SeeLA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 701(B) (2003).
21. Surety Bond Filing, State v. Davis, Magis. No. 459-591 (La. Crim. Dist. Ct.
Orleans Parish filed May 23, 2005).
22. Bill of Information Filing, Davis; Magis. No. 459-591 (filed May 20,2005).
23. Surety Bond Filing, supm note 21.
24. Arraignment Appearance, Davis Magis. No. 459-591 (June 6, 2005).
25. Id.
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On June 28, 2005, Mr. Davis pled guilty as charged" He was
sentenced to a five-month suspended sentence, one year of inactive
probation, and approximately $450 in fines and fees.27 Mr. Davis was
directed to appear in court on August 9, 2005, to pay these fines and
fees.8 Mr Davis and the public defender bid each other farewell; the
public defender did not monitor fine payments.
On July 26, 2005, Mr Davis was arrested in a new case and
charged with two felony the!? offenses.9 His initial appearance was a
virtual carbon copy of the one he had only three months before, except
this time the judge set a $25,000 bond The case was scheduled for a
rule-to-show-cause hearing on September 24, 2005' Untl then, Mr
Davis would be unrepresented Because he had no attorney
representing hin in this new case, or one in his old case, Mr Davis
was unable to address a serious problem confronting him: Ifhe was in
custody on the new case, how could he show up in court on the old
case topay his fines and fees?
August 9, 2005, came and went. No one brought Mr Davis to
court for his scheduled appearance to pay fines and fees in his first
case. The judge had his clerk enter an order: 'Defendant Davis failed
to appear for payment. The court issued a no bond alias capias
[warrant] for the arrest of the defendant '3 2 No one in the criminal
justice system realized that Mr Davis was in jail, in the bwlding next
door to the courthouse, waiting for the prosecutor. decision about
whether to accept prosecuton of a new case against him. When the
sheriff s office did report Mr Daviss arrest to the court, the court
calendared the case fora new status hearing on September28, 2005"
When Katuina came, Mr Davis was lodged in the OPP Like
other evacuated detainees, Mr Davis was tansferred to several
different state and local facilities. Mr Davis was one of the lucky
ones, he had made contact with his family, who had lived in New
Orleans' ravished Ninth Ward His mother, who had refused to
evacuate, was rescued from her home by a neighbor who had
26. Trial Appearance, Davis, Magis. No. 459-591 (June 28, 2005).
27. Id.
28. Id
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commandeered a boat. The water had risen above the threshold of the
kitchen in herraisedhome.
In Februaty of 2006, the Tulane Law Clinc interviewed a
randomly assembled group of Orleans Parish prisoners who were
tempomily housed in Feniday, Louisiana, nearly 200 miles from New
Orleans. Mr Davis was among them.'
Mr Davis had no legal papers that explained why he was in jail
He had not seen or heard from an attorney since a month before
Katrina." He did not know the name or the telephone number of the
last public defender who had represented him. In truth, no public
defender represented him at all.
Mr. Davis told the law students that he was in jail on a theft
charge. As he explained it, the charges against him must have been
accepted Afer all, his sixty days ofD.A. time had come and gone, but
he had not been released
The students returned to New Orleans and pulled Mr Daviss
court files. The district attorneys office had refused the theft charges
against him on August 20, 2005, more than a week before Katrina
made landfall6 The reason Mr Davis had been detained evacuated
and imprisoned for nearly six months after Katrina? He failed to
appear to pay $448 in fines and fees because he was in jail on a charge
that would eventually be dismissed
What could have prevented this tragedy? A lawyer
111. PRECHARGE DETAINEES: THE PRE-KATRiNA STATUS Quo
Louisiana's statutes require that every criminal defendant be
provided with counsel within seventy-two hours of arrest. 7 Until
recently, however, it was the practice in Orleans Parish for the public
defender to represent new arrestees for their initial appearance only.8
That is, the public defender stood up at the initial appearance, where
the defendant's bail was set. Then, the public defender sat down, and
34. See Defense Counsel Appearance, Davis, Magis. No. 459-591 (Feb. 24, 2005).
35. Of course, had he known the number, no one would have answered; those phones
would remain out of order for several more months.
36. Charges Refused, State v. Davis, Magis. No. 458-290 (Aug. 23, 2005).
37. Louisiana's Code of Ciminal Procedure article 230.1 (A) (2003) states: "The
sheriff or law enforcement officer having custody of an arrested person shall bring him
promptly, and in any case within seventy-two hours from the time of the arrest, before a judge
for the purpose of appointment of counsel." However, article 230.1(B) tempers subsection
A's imperative with a clause that seems to beg the question of the entitlement to precharge
counsel: "At this appearance, if a defendant has the right to have the court appoint counsel to
defend him, the court shall assign counsel to the defendant." Id. art. 230.1 (3).
38. See Vi Landry, Defense Less, GAMBIT WKLY., Sept. 5, 2006, at 19.
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poor defendants remained unrepresented, pending a prosecutorial
decision to accept or refuse the charges.
According to Louisiana law, following an arrest, the prosecution
has sixty days to accept or refuse prosecution of felony charges filed
against a detained suspect; the prosecution has forty-five days in which
to make this decision about a misdemeanor case. 9 If the forty-five-day
or sixty-day screening period passes without the prosecution accepting
the charge, the defendant is entitled to release without any bond
obligation.4" Pre-Katrina, in casual acknowledgement of this
entitlement, the initial appearance judges routinely calendar felony
cases for sixty days after arrest for routine monitoring of whether the
defendant should be released because the prosecution failed to file
charges within sixty days. However, no public defender maintained a
list of precharge detainees and their maximum charge-or-release date.
So, in theory, sixty days after arrest, if the district attorney had not
filed a bill of information, the court ordered the defendant's release. In
reality, if the court missed a release date, the detainee stayed in jail.
How can this be legal? Does the United States Constitution
really permit the detention of uncounseled, uncharged criminal
suspects?
The question itself is perhaps best broken down into two
questions. The first is a black letter question: Does the United States
Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court,
permit the state to detain unrepresented precharge suspects for up to
sixty days? An answer to this question requires close examination of
the m/es established by the Supreme Court's Fifth and Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence. The second is a normative question: Does
a constitutional system that permits the state to incarcerate
unrepresented precharge suspects for up to sixty days comport with
our expectations of a meaningful adversarial system that promotes due
process and fair combat? An answer to this question requires close
39. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 701(A) (2003).
40. Id art. 701(B). Although Louisiana's lengthy screening period is unique, the
dilemma posed by uncounseled precharge detainees is a national one. In Riverside,
California, each year 12,000 defendants plead guilty without ever speaking to a lawyer.
Kyung M. Lee, Comment, Reinventng Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders, Indigent
Defendants, and the Right to Counsel, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 375 (2004). Ironically, County
ofRiverside v McLaughlin is the birthplace of the Supreme Court's forty-eight-hour rule for
probable cause determinations. 500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991). Only eight states guarantee the right
to counsel at an initial appearance. See Douglas L. Colbert, Coming Soon to a Court Near
You-Convicting the Unrepresented at the Bail Stage: An Autopsy of a State High Court
Sua Sponte Rejection oflndigent Defendants'Right to Counsel, 36 SETON HALL L. R. 653,
709 (2006).
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examination of the rhetoric that accompanies the Supreme Court's
Fifth and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. A comparison of the rules
and the rhetoric offers insight into the problem of precharge detainees
and suggests reimagining those detainees' constitutional rights.
A. Black-LetterLaw
In its earliest formulations, the Supreme Court's right-to-counsel
jurisprudence arose under the fundamental-fairness test of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause." Powell v Alabama, the bedrock of
right-to-counsel rules and rhetoric, was a Fifth Amendment decision.42
Powels holding was, in reality, quite narrow. It held simply that, in
capital cases in which an indigent defendant was "incapable
adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble
mindedness, illiteracy, or the like" the Due Process Clause required a
court to assign counsel to represent the defendant "at such a time or
under such circumstances" that the assigned counsel could provide
meaningful assistance "in the preparation and trial of the case. '
Despite Powels narrow holding, its reasoning and rhetoric were
broad and powerful. Powells power lies in its affirmation that a
criminal defendant's need for legal assistance may be greatest during
the pretrial period "when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation
and preparation [are] vitally important."
Six years later, in the context of a federal criminal case, the
Supreme Court developed a Sixth Amendment rule founded on
Powells Fifth Amendment rhetoric. 5 Considering the plight of three
marines who "were arraigned, tried, convicted and sentenced that day
to four and one-half years in the penitentiary" the Supreme Court
moved to a Sixth Amendment analysis.46 The fundamental unfairness
of forcing untrained laymen to combat professional prosecutors
prompted the Court to establish a Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel
rule that guaranteed appointed counsel to all indigent defendants faced
with federal criminal prosecutions.7 While Johnson v Zerbst was a
Sixth Amendment opinion, it was based on Powels Fifth Amendment
41. The phrase "fundamental fairness" was first articulated in Betts v Brady, 316
U.S. 455, 462 (1942), overruled by Gideon v Wainwright; 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963)
(concluding the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel is a fundamental right).
42. 287 U.S. 45,68 (1932).
43. Id. at 71.
44. Id at 57.
45. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463, 467-68 (1938).
46. Id at 460, 467-68.
47. Id at 463.
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analysis and Powells normative expectations of what fairness required
when untrained laypersons navigated a complex legal system and
confronted a professional adversary."
In the landmark case of Gideon v Wainwl b4 the Supreme
Court extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to indigent
defendants charged in state criminal court proceedings.49 Gideon's
reasoning suggested some rough equation between normative
expectations and legal entitlements. The "widespread belief that
lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries," was a key
factor in the Court's decision." Gideon's rhetoric consisted of a
fiercely realistic evaluation of the fate of an unrepresented criminal
defendant: "[A]ny person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a




In 1964, in Massiah v United States, the Supreme Court relied
upon the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to exclude unrepresented
statements that an indicted defendant made, unknowingly, to a secret
jailhouse informer." The Court's rule and its rhetoric reflected a
holistic concern about the effects of unrepresented statements: a right
to counsel at trial must also protect a defendant from unrepresented
police interrogation. 3 "Anything less ... might deny a defendant
'effective representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid
and advice would help him.
' ''1
4
In that same year, the Supreme Court announced the short-lived
rule of Escobedo v Illinois.5 In Escobedo, the Court extended the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel to protect as-yet unindicted
defendants against precharge, unrepresented police interrogation."
The rhetoric and rationale supporting Escobedo's rule illustrated the
close relationship between the Fifth Amendment prohibition on forced
self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which
implied a fair trial based only on evidence lawfilly obtained. Had
Escobedo and its precharge right to counsel survived, the Katrina
48. See id
49. 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963).
50. Id. at 344.
51. Id
52. 377 U.S. 201,206 (1964).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 204 (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)).
55. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
56. Id. at 490-91.
57. Id. at 488-89.
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precharge detainees would never have faced their incarceration
unrepresented.
However, Escobedo prompted a collective panic across criminal
justice communities.58 How was the criminal justice system to provide
counsel to every defendant at the station house? States were still
grappling with Gideon's imperative of appointed counsel for all state
court defendants. Now, the ante had been upped significantly. It
appeared that the state would have to provide all arrestees with
counsel, while they were still at the station house.
In a jurisprudential blink of an eye, Escobedo vanished, and the
Supreme Court launched itself in to a new pattern of constitutional
rulemaking. With its Fifth Amendment holding in Mianda v Arizona,
and its Sixth Amendment holding in Kirby v Illinois, the Supreme
Court severed the rule-based relationship between arrest, interrogation,
and the right to counsel." Yet, the Supreme Court's rhetoric continued
to portray arrest, interrogation, and the right to counsel as deeply
intertwined.
The Mi-anda analysis itself was surprising to legal observers;
M/kanda had been submitted to the Supreme Court as a Sixth
Amendment right-to-counsel case.' Instead of considering the due
process and right-to-counsel implications of custodial interrogations,
the Supreme Court veered unexpectedly back toward the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.6' Viewed against the
backdrop of the Court's right-to-counsel jurisprudence, Minzda
substituted a less expensive, more convenient constitutional protection
than the expensive and logistically challenging provision of counsel to
arrestees. The Court's solution-the now-ubiquitous Mbanda
warnings-was to create a stopgap remedy, one that would serve as
short-term replacement for a forthcoming attorney. The suspect would
be told he has the right to consult with an attorney; if he cannot afford
a lawyer, the court will appoint one for him.62
Even as it substituted warnings and promises for actual lawyers,
the Supreme Court further narrowed the temporal scope of the Sixth
58. See Naomi Murakawa, The RacialAntecedents to Federal Sentencing Guidelines.-
How Congress Judged the Judges from Brown to Booker, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
473, 488-89 (2006) (noting concern after the Escobedo decision about its potential effect on
crime-control measures).
59. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-79 (1966); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,
689-90 (1972).
60. Manda, 384 U.S. at 440,465-66.




Amendment right to counsel by establishing the critical-stage
doctrine.63 In relevant part, the critical-stage doctrine holds that the
right to counsel attaches only after the initiation of adversary criminal
proceedings by "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment."''
Yet, despite this narrow rule, the rhetoric of the Supreme Court's
right-to-counsel law remained relatively unchanged. The analytical
shift narrowly defined the meaning of the term "prosecution" as used
in the Sixth Amendment's Counsel Clause." The Court's rhetoric
continued to focus upon the complex machinery of modem law
enforcement that involves 'critical confrontations of the accused by
the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well
settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere
formality."'' ' The Supreme Court held that the term "criminal
prosecution" limited the Sixth Amendment's counsel guarantee to
those proceedings in which "adversary judicial proceedings have been
initiated."'7 As one state court explained, a complaint is not "a formal
commitment by the People to prosecute [the] defendant" and absent a
"formal commitment by the People," there is no right to counsel.68
This narrow reading of the text of the counsel guarantee was
heretofore unknown in the Supreme Court's right-to-counsel
jurisprudence. The Supreme Court went to some lengths to try to
square its restrictive rule with its expansive rhetorical commitment.
The Kirby plurality insisted that its commitment to the formal
commencement of adversary proceedings was not a retreat from its
rhetoric of fairness. 9 Rather, the formal, prosecutorial-proceedings
rule was a natural outcropping of criminal justice realities."0 The
initiation of adversary proceedings was "the starting point of our
whole system of adversary criminal justice."7' Notwithstanding the
fine rhetoric, the Supreme Court had narrowed the Sixth Amendment's
reach in order to avoid "drastic expansion of the right to counsel."72
63. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224-27 (1967).
64. Kby, 406 U.S. at 689. The sole exception to this bright-line approach is the rule
in United States v Wade, a case that guarantees a right to counsel at pretrial line-up
identification procedures. 388 U.S. at 241-42.
65. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689-91; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
66. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 699 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 224).
67. Id. at 689-91 (majority opinion).
68. People v. Thompkins, 521 N.E.2d 38, 51 (111. 1988).
69. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.
70. Id at 690.
71. Id at 689.
72. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 316 (1973).
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Mianda would compensate for any attendant harm that might befall
unrepresented precharge detainees; uncharged detainees would
henceforth lack counsel's guiding hand.
Of course, the Fifth Amendment prohibition on the deprivation of
liberty without due process might still be invoked to prevent two
months of unrepresented detention. To date, the Supreme Court has
not ruled upon this question.
In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court had a limited opportunity to
articulate the relationship between the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause and the rights of precharge detainees. Although United States
v Salerno involved the legality of the detention of indicted suspects,
the Supreme Court lavished considerable analysis upon the procedural
protections that rendered defendant Salerno's pretrial detention
lawful." Chief among them was the fact that the law providing for his
detention, the Bail Reform Act, guaranteed Salerno the assistance of
counsel in litigating his entitlement to release.74 While the opinion
suggests that an arrestee may have a right to counsel at bail
proceedings, it still does not address a right to counsel during the
period between arrest and formal charging." As a result, across the
nation, there is a firm legal consensus: uncharged detainees have no
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
B. Normative Expectations
Critiques of the "no charge, no counsel" detention abound. Most
reflect our normative expectations about access to counsel and the
adversary relationship between detainees and the state. Most obvious
is the sheer absurdity of the proposition that a person detained (in
Louisiana, for two months) lacks an adversary relationship with the
state."6 Sixty days into pretrial detention, news that they lack an
73. 481 U.S. 739, 750-52 (1987). The deprivation of counsel at the precharge stage
advances the fictional distinction between punitive and regulatory pretrial incarceration
articulated by the majority in Salerno. Id. at 749.
74. Id at 751; see Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 1, 98 Stat.
1976 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (2000)). For a thorough
discussion of the right to counsel at bail proceedings, see Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do
Attorneys Really Matter? The Empincal and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bal, 23
CARDOZO L. REv. 1719 (2002).
75. In this view, a complaint is not "a formal commitment by the People to prosecute
[the] defendant" and absent a "formal commitment by the People" there is no right to
counsel. People v. Thompkins, 521 N.E.2d 38, 51 (111. 1988).
76. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 183, 186-89 (1984) (finding that
respondents were not entitled to counsel even though they remained in "administrative
detention" because "adversary judicial proceedings" had not been instated).
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adversary relationship with the state would surprise most detainees;
the prison jumpsuits, shackles, guards, and bars would seem to
indicate an adversarial relationship between the detainee and the state.
Yet the misguided, formal-initiation rule guarantees that, however
adversary the circumstances may be, a pretrial detainee is not entitled
to the assistance of counsel until an experienced professional
prosecutor takes the steps necessary to trigger the counsel guarantee.
Louisiana's Code of Criminal Procedure magnifies and
exacerbates the fundamental unfairness associated with the
incarceration of uncounseled poor people. The extraordinary length of
the Louisiana screening period converts an otherwise appropriate
administrative charging function into an illicit system of plea
extortions and punishment without trial. Louisiana's mind-boggling
sixty-day screening period means that the old criminal justice maxim,
"you can beat the rap, but you can't beat the ride," is truer in Louisiana
than elsewhere.
If the state declines to accept the charges against a detainee, the
end result is equally shocking to our expectation of procedural
fairness: the state can unabashedly imprison an unrepresented suspect
for two months and then release that suspect without any opportunity
to clear his or her name."
Yet, if we continue to believe the Supreme Court's promise that
custom and practice can provide evidence of when counsel is required,
then the answer to whether precharge detainees are entitled to counsel
is clear. As the Supreme Court has explained, poor defendants are
entitled to appointed lawyers, just as "defendants who have the money
hire lawyers to defend [them]" as soon as possible after arrest. 8 Our
normative expectation that defense counsel will begin his or her work
as soon as possible after arrest comes directly from the Supreme
Court's mouth. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's rules circumvent its
right-to-counsel rhetoric; the "widespread belief that lawyers in
criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries," has nevertheless failed to
generate a rule providing precharge detainees with counsel.79
Within our normative expectations of criminal procedure, "we
tend to forget that, for all our fine words and complex constitutional
77. LA. CODE CRiM. PRoc. ANN. art 701(B). It has been my experience, and the
experience of other defense attorneys in Orleans Parish, that suspects are often held for sixty
days without formal charges because, as one assistant district attorney explained to me, "sixty
days was as much time as he was going to get anyway, so he did the time, we'll let it go now."
78. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
79. Id.
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doctrine, ... the Sixth Amendment ... [does not] require[] the
appointment of lawyers at the earliest stage of proceedings."' The
Mimnda rhetoric has played a key role in raising our expectations
about appointment of counsel and obscuring the true plight of
precharge detainees."
The Abnda warnings are quintessential American hallmarks,
known to most citizens across the country and to observers of
American culture around the world. For example, I once told a cab
driver in Indonesia that I was a public defender in New York City. He
braked, turned his head back toward me and gave a flawless recitation
of the MAnda warnings.
If one takes the Mhnda warnings literally, one expects that upon
arrest a poor person can request the appointment of counsel and that an
appointed lawyer will thereafter be provided. But our normative
expectations about the right to counsel go beyond the expectation
raised by Minzda. True, after hearing the police intone "you have the
right to an attorney, if you cannot afford one, one will be appointed to
represent you'" an arrestee might rightly invoke his right to counsel
and then look wonderingly about the jail as the police explain, "you
have to see a judge to get an attorney appointed." But nothing about
our Mianda expectations explains our gut response to the rest of the
right-to-counsel story. Consider the following hypothetical.
The arrestee asks: "When will I see the judge?"
"Tomorrow." The arrestee heaves a sigh of relief "'So, 171 get
my lawyer tomorrow." 'Not exactly," is the police offlcer. reply.
"There will be a lawyer in the courtroom when the judge sets
bail, but that lawyer8 in that courtroom every day for every new
arrest That won't be your real lawyer You 71 get one of those
later "
"'When mght that be ?" the suspect wonders. The officer
explain s. "The DA has to decide if he wants to prosecute you.
He got 60 days to decide about you, that a rush job because
you re in custody; ifyou bond out, they get 120 days to decide."
80. Victoria Nourse, Gideon As Muted Trumpe4 58 MD. L. REv. 1417, 1420 (1999).
81. Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings hi Light of Contemporny
Law and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REv. 781, 799-801 (2006) (noting that Kfirbymade the
Sixth Amendment inapplicable to precharge detainees); Michael J. Howe, Note, Tomorrow
Massiah: Towards a 'Prosecution Specific" Understanding of the Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 134, 138 (2004) ("Miranda... returned the Sixth Amendment
debate back to the post-indictment [or information] context.").
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"So once the &strict atomey decides, Il get a lawyer?,"
asks the suspect. 'Not exactly," is the officer. reply "Once
charges are filed you're arraigned Thats where you say 'not
guilty.' You get your lawyer at thatproceeding. "
"When will the araignment be'" asks the increasingly
alarmedprisoner "Within 30 days of the DA decision-all told
you 're guaranteed to have your own lawyer within 90 days. "
Despemte, the suspect asks: "Can Ijust go ahead and agree
that the district attorney should charge me?" 'Wope," says the
officer, 'hey make that decision on their own. "
"But I'm not guilty," wails the prisoner 'Jn 90 days it will
be too late. There won't be any way to find all the witnesses who
saw what happened AndIlhave lost myjob. My wife won't be
able to make the rent. Can't this go any faster?" The officer
smiles. "'Perhaps you U like to make a statement to us after all?
We could try to clear tis whole thing up and send you on home."
As one commentator has noted:
If the principal purpose of criminal procedure were to protect courts,
then this upside-down world would make perfect sense. It would make
perfect sense to start the right to counsel at judicialproceedings rather
than when the defendant sits in jail .... But that is not what most
lawyers or most people think.82
Our normative expectation is that defense counsel enforces
otherwise unenforceable rights by arriving at the arrestee's side and
remaining there, metaphorically, throughout the process. The reality in
an upside-down world is that, for a newly arrested poor person, the
right to counsel depends entirely upon the speed with which
prosecutors decide to accept or refuse prosecution of the alleged
offense. And, as discussed, the operative institutions of criminal justice
have strong incentives to postpone access to counsel for as long as
possible, for as many people as possible. 3
Pre-Katrina, the consequences of this upside-down world were
clear, if not commonly understood.' Precharge incarceration creates a
perilous plight for poor people. The state has deprived them of their
liberty and prevented them from working to feed their families or
prove their innocence. They confront a complicated procedural system
82. Nourse, supra note 80, at 1427.
83. See inqfa text accompanying notes 123-160.
84. See Garrett & Tetlow, supra note 1, at 132-34 (noting problems with the New
Orleans criminal justice system prior to Katrina).
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and a knowledgeable professional adversary. Yet, prosecutors and law
enforcement have a perverse incentive to delay filing formal charges:
without formal charges, they can negotiate with unrepresented
individuals, after prolonged incarceration: they can easily encourage
detainees to plead guilty, cooperate, or to confess. The story of
Gregory Lewis is illustrative.
Gregory Lewis was arrested on October 9, 2005, and
charged with a petty offense carrying a maximum penalty of six
months of incarceraton and a $500 &ine." As was the custom in
Orleans Parish, a public defender stood up for Mr Lewis at his
initial appearance. He was then abandoned and unrepresented
pending a screening decision by the district attorney office. The
district attomeys office accepted the case, but because Katrina
had closed the state courthouse and scattered the state pisoners,
Mr Lewis was never brought to court for arrignment. Between
October 2005 and July 2006, Mr Lewis remained in the custody
of the state and unrepresented"6
When the Tulane Law Clinic enrolled on Mr Lewis behalf,
students and faculty appeared to demand his prompt release.
Afier all, he had already spent ten months in jail, unrepresented
and without ever being arraigned7 He had served nearly four
months longer than the maximum sentence available had he been
convicted of the offense."
At the araignment and hearing on the motion for release,
the prosecutor offered Mr Lewis the opportunity to plead guity
as charged in exchange for "tine served" When Mr Lewis
declined the offer, both the prosecution and the court expressed
sulprise. After all, Mr Lewis had already done the time, what
was the harm in taking the plea?9
85. Bill of Information Filing, State v. Lewis, Magis. No. 462-851 (La. Crim. Dist.
Ct. Orleans Parish filed Nov. 30, 2005).
86. Arraignment Reset, Lewis, Magis. No. 462-851 (July 31, 2006).
87. Id
88. Id.
89. Ultimately, the clinic filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Mr. Lewis on
the grounds that the state had violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Motion To
Quash the Bill of Information, Lewis, Magis. No. 462-851 (Aug. 21, 2006). In response, the
state argued that Mr. Lewis had been represented by counsel at initial appearance, knew of his
right to a speedy trial, and had deliberately chosen not to pursue a speedy trial. The state also
argued that Mr. Lewis's incarceration was not unreasonable because, as an alleged addict, he
benefited from an incarceration that allowed the "deadly poison" of drugs to leave his body.
The trial court granted Mr. Lewis's motion for dismissal with prejudice. Defense Motion
Granted, Lewis, Magis. No. 462-851 (Aug. 21, 2006).
20071 1193
TULANE LA WREVIEW
Unregulated and unreviewable acts of prosecutorial discretion
determine the earliest point at which the constitutional right to counsel
will arise. Yet, prosecutors and law enforcement officials have clear
incentives to delay formal charges in order to negotiate with
unrepresented individuals instead of with attorneys. Judges with
crowded criminal dockets have a similar incentive. Perhaps
unrepresented individuals are more likely to plead guilty and take a
sentence of "time served," thereby clearing the court's docket, than are
detainees who have counsel to assist them in making persuasive bail
arguments or marshaling facts to present a cogent trial defense.'
Katrina exposed the fundamental unfairness of this upside-down
world because it magnified, in raw numbers of detainees and in raw
measures of weeks and months, the harms worked by the critical-stage
doctrine. When the functioning systems of government failed, their
record keeping and file maintenance failed as well. Court record
keeping failed too. Because no counsel was assigned to "remember"
the plight of the precharge detainees, the New Orleans criminal justice
system experienced a kind of collective system failure that left
hundreds of unrepresented, uncharged detainees languishing in the
prison. Those uncharged, unrepresented people remained in jail long
after the authorized screening period had expired, long after the date
on which they were absolutely and unequivocally entitled to release.
Of course, the United States Constitution provides a ceiling, not a
floor, for the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. Louisiana
could have, with its constitution or its laws, created a meaningful right
to counsel for precharge detainees. Indeed, as noted earlier, Louisiana
statutes explicitly provide for the appointment of counsel to all
precharge arrestees. Why then did Louisiana fail the precharge
detainees?
IV DELVING DEEPER: EXPLAINING THE PLIGHT OF THE ORLEANS
PARISH PRECHARGE DETAINEES
Louisiana statutory law clearly and unequivocally states that
counsel is to be appointed within seventy-two hours of a suspect's
arrest.9' Why was this clear and unambiguous rule flagrantly,
repeatedly, and unabashedly broken by judges and lawyers alike?
90. But see Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Repirsentation: An
Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REv. 423,447 (2007) (noting that
"pro se felony defendants were much more likely to go to trial than represented defendants").
91. LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 230.1(A).
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A. Gross Underfimding
How could the public defender system absorb and institutionalize
the unconscionable compromises associated with the abandonment of
precharge detainees? Chronic, pervasive, and grotesque underfunding
offers one answer to this question. Katrina's aftermath helps illustrate
this, as Katrina was the straw that broke the camel's back of the
precarious public defense system.
1. How Underfunding Public Defense Led to the Abandonment of
Precharge Detainees
For decades prior to Katrina, the New Orleans public defender
system was too poorly resourced to meet all of its client obligations.
The abandonment of precharge detainees helped the public defender
conserve scarce resources.
It has long been common knowledge in Orleans Parish that the
district attorney's office declines prosecution in nearly fifty percent of
the arrests made by police.92 Thus, without the public defender lifting
a finger, the prosecution eliminated a significant percentage of the
public defender's incoming caseload. Under those circumstances, the
institutional cost-benefit created a resourcing imperative that was clear
to the lawyers, if not to the detainees. Identifying precharge detainees
as potential clients, rather than as actual clients, markedly decreased
the number of clients the public defender was obliged to assist. Public
defenders rationed their resources by withholding legal assistance; a
public defender would not assist a detainee unless the prosecutor
formally charged that detainee. The precharge detainees whose cases
were refused by the prosecution received no legal assistance at all.
For those whose cases were ultimately refused, the lack of
representation worked incalculable personal suffering. Had a lawyer
represented them, those detainees might have been released on bail.
Had a lawyer investigated their cases and approached the state with
exculpatory evidence, the prosecution might have dropped the case
after five or ten days, not five or ten weeks. Those detainees might
have reemerged from jail to find their jobs still available, their families
still intact, and their rent still current. Instead, the public defender
system rationed resources by trading one detainee's unnecessary jail
time for another detainee's access to counsel. Detainees waited for
92. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The ScreeninglBargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN.
L. REv. 29, 74 (2002).
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sixty days to see whether they had won the Pyrrhic victory of being
one of the fortunate detainees whose cases had been refused.
For those whose cases were ultimately accepted, the lack of
representation may well have cost them their chance of acquittal.
Prolonged pretrial detention exacerbates the asymmetry of power
between the state and the individual.93 It also moots a defendant's most
important goal: the avoidance of jail time." Counsel's critical pretrial
role in investigation and case preparation is at the core of the Supreme
Court's right-to-counsel rhetoric." After sixty days, bystander
witnesses are virtually impossible to locate. Physical evidence, such as
blood splatters or fingerprints, have been washed away. Memories
have faded and appearances have changed. The defendant has lost
immeasurable and unknowable opportunities for investigation and case
development.
When Katrina hit, all of these harms were multiplied. For those
whose cases were ultimately refused, there are no words to adequately
describe the unnecessary suffering caused by their evacuation terrors
and their long incarcerations. For those whose cases were accepted,
there is no way to measure how Katrina altered their ability to muster a
defense. Witnesses and crime scenes simply vanished overnight.
2. How Katrina Caused the Collapse of Public Defense
Article I, section 13 of the Louisiana Constitution states that the
legislature "shall provide for a uniform system for securing and
compensating qualified counsel for indigents ' " The legislative
response to that constitutional mandate has been disgraceful. Prior to
Katrina, the only money that the legislature guaranteed to the public
district defender board was the sum of $10,000 per year and fees
generated by criminal bonds, bond forfeitures, and convictions."
93. See, e.g., People v. Martinez, 810 N.YS.2d 638, 641-44 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (noting
that deliberately delaying initiation of formal adversary proceedings by the state in order to
delay attachment of the right to counsel would weigh against a finding of the voluntariness of
the defendant's confession).
94. For a discussion on the importance of precharge investigation, see Jenny Roberts,
Too Little, Too Late. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Dun> To Investigate, and Pretnial
Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1101-04 (2004). For a discussion
of counsel's role in precharge screening and bargaining, see Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the
Bright Line: A ContemporaryRpght-to-CounselDocftne, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1635, 1663-77
(2003).
95. See geneially Roberts, supra note 94, at 1103 (noting the Supreme Court's
"renewed attention ... to failures to investigate").
96. LA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
97. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:146(B)-(C) (Supp. 2007).
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Section 15:146 of Louisiana's Revised Statutes provides the
primary source of funding for public defenders.98 It provides, in
relevant part: "The sum of thirty-five dollars shall be assessed in cases
in which a defendant is convicted after a trial, a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, or after forfeiting bond, and shall be in addition to all other
fines, costs, or forfeitures imposed."'9 As a result, "criminal violation
assessments, mostly traffic tickets," are the primary source of public
defender funding in Louisiana."
Prior to Katrina, approximately seventy-five percent of the
Orleans Parish public defender's budget consisted of fines and fees
imposed on convicted traffic, misdemeanor, and felony defendants.' °'
After Katrina, there were no tickets, there were no courthouses, and
certainly there were no guilty pleas or trials, so there were no
convictions and thus no assessments. Without the criminal
assessments, the public defender's office could no longer pay its
employees. Katrina put the public defender out of business and
thereby magnified the conflicts of interest inherent in Louisiana's
funding scheme.' 2
3. What Katrina Laid Bare
The Louisiana public defender funding system creates
extraordinary conflicts of interest between the public defender and
indigent defendants.'0 3 In this funding system, appointed counsel labor
98. Id. § 15:146(A).
99. Id. § 15:146(B).
100. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 789 (La. 1993). Other statutes provide dribs and
drabs of funding based upon similarly conflict-laden scenarios. For example, fees associated
with the posting of each commercial bail bond are funneled to the public defender. LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 15:85.1 (A)(2)(b) (2005).
101. See Laura Parker, City Public Defender System Troubled Before Katrina, USA
TODAY, May 23, 2006, at 4A.
102. See id.
103. Conflicts of interest arise when counsel's situation is "inherently conducive to
divided loyalties." State v. Kahey, 436 So. 2d 475, 484 (La. 1983) (citing Zuck v. Alabama,
588 E2d 436, 439 (5th Cir. 1979)). A divided loyalty may arise either from counsel's duty to
another client or from counsel's personal interest. See Beets v. Scott, 65 E3d 1258, 1269-70
(5th Cir. 1995) (finding that a conflict exists where attorney's personal interests are adverse to
those of his client); Zuck, 588 E2d at 439 ("The interests of the other client and the defendant
are sufficiently adverse if... the attorney owes a duty to the defendant to take some action
that could be detrimental to [another] client."); LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)
(2006) ("A... conflict of interest exists if... there is a significant risk that the representation
... will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client ... or by a
personal interest of the lawyer."); see also State v. Cisco, 01-2732, pp. 18-20 (La. 12/3/03);
861 So. 2d 118, 131 (2003) (noting that Louisiana courts have found that an attorney cannot
render effective legal assistance when faced with a conflict of interest).
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under two actual conflicts of interest. First, the public defender's
representation of each individual client conflicts with his obligation to
all of the public defender's other clients.' Second, the public
defender's personal interests are adverse to the interests of indigent
defendants.' °5  Yet, these rules have stood, with only minor
modifications, for nearly forty years. °" Prior to Katrina, no indigent
client or public defender raised any serious challenge to the rules'
constitutionality, although there have been many challenges to the
adequacy of the resulting funding situation.' 7 Surely something is
profoundly amiss in the local legal culture's conception of the attorney-
client relationship. Katrina laid bare the ugly underbelly of criminal
justice dollar and cents and thereby lent insight into a lawyering
culture that long labored under these conflicts of interest.
The conflicts themselves are straightforward. It is black-letter
law that all criminal defendants, including indigent defendants, are
entitled to the assistance of counsel.'0 This right to counsel is not
satisfied by the mere appearance of a warm body wearing a business
suit and holding a copy of the criminal code. Rather, the right to
counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel, free from any
conflict of interest.' 9
104. See LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a).
105. Seeid.
106. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:146 notes (Historical and Statutory Notes) (Supp.
2007). The most significant changes have been the ever-increasing amount of the assessment
for convictions. See id.
107. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 05-0551, 05-0321, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/2/05);
916 So.2d 431, 433-34 (discussing challenges to the inadequate funding of the Louisiana
public defender system).
108. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
109. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)); see also State v. Franklin, 400 So. 2d 616, 620-21 (La. 1981)
(finding that the defendant did not receive "effective" counsel as required by the United
States and Louisiana Constitutions because his attorney had a conflict of interest).
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that ethical rules
prohibit attorneys from laboring under conflicts of interest such as those created by the
Louisiana funding statutes. For example, the American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct prohibit a lawyer from representing a client if that representation "will
be directly adverse to another client," if "there is a significant risk that the representation ...
will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client," or will be
materially limited "by a personal interest of the lawyer." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.7(a) (2003). The Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct demand a similar conflict-
free relationship. LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2006). An attorney's ethical
obligation to a client creates a fiduciary duty that prohibits conflicted representation. See
Plaquemines Parish Comm'n Council v. Delta Dev. Co., 502 So. 2d 1034, 1040 (La. 1987)
(noting that as a fiduciary, a lawyer has an "obligation to render a full and fair disclosure" of
all his interests to his client).
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Each of the public defender's clients is entitled to zealous and
effective representation in all aspects of his or her case, including
assessments, fines, and fees associated with conviction. Yet, as
mentioned above, the Louisiana funding system creates two actual
conflicts of interest.
In the Louisiana funding scheme, if a public defender
aggressively objects to the imposition and collection of fines and
assessments, that lawyer forsakes funds essential to public defender's
ability to represent other clients. Alternatively, if the public defender
aggressively pursues the assessments and fees, the public defender
forsakes the interests of the individual indigent client, who is entitled
to challenge the imposition of fines and fees.
More significantly, in the Louisiana system, public defenders rely
upon client convictions for their own paychecks. Public defenders are
funded not by fees assessed for representation, but by fees assessed for
convictions."' A public defender with a perfect "no losses" record can
rapidly become a public defender with a perfect "no paycheck" record.
Thus, the funding scheme creates an institutionalized conflict of
interest that forces the public defender to choose between individual
client interests and the institutional and individual interests of the
public defender's office and employees."' A failure to impose and
collect criminal assessments results in a failure to pay public defenders
and their staffs.
Even before Katrina, there was no administrative mystery or
financial sleight of hand that insulated individual public defenders
from understanding and appreciating this conflict. In one Louisiana
parish, a public defender's office sued to compel local judges to
increase the assessments imposed upon convicted persons and to more
aggressively pursue collection of those assessments in order to better
fund the woefully under-resourced public defender's office."2  This
type of action does little to promote good relationships between public
defenders and their clients. It is little wonder that many indigent
110. LA. REv. STAT.ANN. § 15:146.
111. I do not suggest that any public defender has ever "thrown" a case for a $35.00
fee. The conflict is one of institutional interest and client-population outcomes.
112. Cf Mark Ballard, Senate Sends In&gent Defense Bill to Blanco, ADVOCATE
(Baton Rouge), June 22, 2005, at 8A (noting a lawsuit alleging that "the state's public-
defender system is so under-funded and so defectively organized that the legal representation
poor people receive at criminal trials does not meet constitutional standards").
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detainees believe that their attorneys get a "special deal" for every plea
their clients take.'
For a system to have persisted with such flagrant conflicts of
interest, one might suppose it to be successful in accumulating and
distributing resources. This has not been true for Orleans Parish or for
other parishes across the state."4 Indeed, notwithstanding the public
defenders' efforts to ration scare resources across an ever-larger client
pool, this funding system has remained spectacularly unsuccessful. In
the words of the Louisiana Supreme Court, the Louisiana legislature
has created an inherently 'unstable and unpredictable approach' to
indigent defense funding."5
It is not surprising that defenders who worked within such an
ethically dissonant funding system made ethically dissonant choices
about the allocation of resources. Prior to Katrina, no indigent client
or public defender raised any serious challenge to the rules'
113. See, e.g., Brief of Appellants at *6-7, Everett v. Rodenbeck, 961 E2d 1575 (5th
Cir. 1992) (No. 91-5038), 1992 WL 12149997 (alleging a public defender deliberately
provided ineffective assistance of counsel in order for the defender to receive a fee under LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:146).
114. For example, in 1990, the police department of the City of East Baton Rouge ran
out of preprinted traffic tickets. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 789 n.9 (La. 1993) (citing
SPANGENBERG GROUP, STUDY OF THE INDIGENT DEFENDER SYSTEM IN LOUISIANA 25 (1992)).
The fees associated with those preprinted tickets were the indigent defender program's
primary source of funding. Id. No tickets were written, no defendants were charged, no
defendants were convicted, no assessments were paid, and public defender salaries were
"suspended while more tickets were being printed." Id.; see NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER
ASS'N, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF TRIAL-LEVEL INDIGENT
DEFENSE SERVICES IN LOUISIANA 40 YEARS AFTER GIDEON 10-29 (2004), available at
http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender Evaluation/la..eval.pdf (detailing the political and
funding considerations that hinder Louisiana's indigent defense system).
115. Peart, 621 So. 2d at 789 (quoting SPANGENBERG GROUP, supa note 114, at 25).
This funding structure also has the peculiar effect of giving a defendant's adversaries-police
and prosecutors-substantial control over the public defender's budget. Moreover, the
prosecutorial discretion inherent in our adversary system means that police and prosecutors
have unbridled discretion in how they use that control. Formal policing policies and day-to-
day police decisions about whether to charge certain crimes imposes a cap on potential
criminal assessments available to the public defender. These policing decisions may be
entirely legitimate policy decisions about law enforcement priorities or may reflect politics
and priorities wholly independent of any animus toward the public defender. See NAT'L
LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, supra note 114, at 24-25. For example, one Louisiana police
department reduced its traffic enforcement in order to encourage business at local casinos.
Id. at 24-25. Another police department refused to accept partial payment of fees in order to
avoid the "administrative" costs associated with processing those fees. Id. District attorneys
exercise a second layer of control over the public defender's funding. District attorneys have
prosecutorial discretion to make charging decisions that range from whom to charge to how
many counts to allege. See LA. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 701 (2003). Each charge
represents a potential conviction and therefore a potential public defender fee.
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constitutionality, although there have been many challenges to the
adequacy of the resulting funding situation."6
After Katrina, everyone knew-the judges, the lawyers, and the
clients-that only criminal assessments, i.e. client convictions, could
keep the public defender's office afloat. No convictions? No lawyers.
Katrina made explicit this implicit and unspoken conflict. In
April 2006, the Tulane Law Clinic successfully challenged section
15:146 as an unconstitutional violation of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel."7 When the trial judge ordered a halt to the imposition and
collection of criminal assessments, a veteran Orleans Parish public
defender was sitting in the gallery, watching. Upon hearing the court's
ruling, he jumped to his feet and anxiously inquired: "Will the Court
stay its ruling and continue to collect the fees until the appellate courts
have ruled?""8
So, the Katrina funding disaster accounts for the total collapse of
the Orleans Indigent Defender Program. It explains why there were no
budgeted funds to pay the attorneys and why, months after Katrina, no
new funds were forthcoming."9  But these funding failures cannot
account for the public defender's failure to institute a record-keeping
system that, at a minimum, monitored the status of precharge
detainees. Even a poor public defender, even one appointed in name
only, could surely keep a list of who was arrested, on what date, and for
what charge. No one has yet alleged that the public defenders in
Orleans Parish had sunk so low that pens and paper were unavailable.
B. Court-Centered Public Defendeis
Another answer then to the public defender's pre- and post-
Katrina failure to accept responsibility for the fate of the precharge
detainees lies in the lawyering culture itself. For a wide range of
institutional and funding reasons, public defenders in New Orleans
116. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 05,0551, 05-0321, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/2/05);
916 So. 2d 431, 433-34 (discussing challenges to the inadequate funding of the Louisiana
public defender system).
117. Vann, supa note 10, at 19.
118. Transcript of Record, State v. Henry (transcript on file with author).
119. It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore why the legislature failed to
provide emergency funds to maintain and sustain public defense in New Orleans. However,
application of public choice theory to the public defense crisis offers one common sense
explanation. See Ronald E Wright, Partky of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach
of Public Choice Theory, 90 IowA L. REv. 219, 253-54 (2004). The population served by
public defenders are all either nonvoters (e.g., recidivist felons) or potential nonvoters (e.g.,
felons-in-waiting). See id. Among the victims of Katrina, criminal defendants ranked last in
the legislative priorities.
2007] 1201
TULANE LA W REVIEW
were not assigned to represent clients, but to handle sections of court.
As a result, the public defender system was court-centered rather than
client-centered. 2' This court-centered philosophy fostered a court-
dependent practice.
The public defender system was so focused on courts, instead of
clients, that public defenders did not routinely maintain files on clients
whose cases had been formally charged. Instead, many lawyers simply
appeared in their assigned section of court each day and handled the
cases listed on the docket. Several months after Katrina, when the
public defender system began to reemerge, the rest of the criminal
justice system learned just how profoundly the public defenders had
abdicated their roles. The testimony of public defender Powell Miller
is illustrative.
Q As you understand it, what is your job? What specific tasks are
you required to perform?
A. I was assigned [this week] to Section "K" to handle all of the
cases there for the public defenderl office.
Q And when you were assigned to handle all of the cases in Section
"K" for the public defender office, di [the Chief Public
Defender] or anyone else provide you with a list of who those
people are?
A. No.
Q Did [the Cef Public Defender] or anyone else in your office
provide you with a list of case numbers as to those defendants that
you were to represent?
A. No.
Q. Now, you and Ihave talked somewhat about this process of trying
to determine who you represent and yesterday we had a chance to
speak and I asked yesterday morning and yesterday afternoon, I
guess, in court here, I sa4 'Who do you represent" and you
said-I think it was "'I don't know. " Is that correct?
A. Correct
Q At my request, did your office undertake to produce a list of
which cases in "'K" have indigent defendants who are currently
represented by [the public defender], who your clients are?
120. See Ari Shapiro, All Things Considered: Locked Up and Forgotten: Flaws in
New Orleans (NPR radio broadcast Jan. 16, 2007) (transcript available at www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?Storyld=6874458).
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A. I believe that [the Chief Public Defender] is working on that
121
now.
As the public defenders began to openly acknowledge the profound
disabilities under which they had always worked, the plight of
precharge detainees became even more apparent. The testimony of
Tilden Greenbaum, Director of the Orleans Indigent Defender
Program, is illustrative.
Q Mr Greenbaum, how many lawyers, prior to Karmna, worked in
Magistates Court?
A Three.
Q Howmany were in Magistates Courtpresent at a time?
A One.
Q On any given day, approximately how many defendants would
appear in Magistrate s Court?
A Twenty, thity; fortJy, who kiows.
Q .... ptv-Katina, did [the public defender] have an opportunit to
conduct a pivate interview with each and every defendant?
A Thats not a-facilities for that is not allowed-not available.
Q Between the initial apperance and arrignment, does [the public
defender] represent indigent defendants?
A We don't have the resources or manpower to do that during
screening.
Q So during screening theres no investigation conducted by your
office?
A No, there is not.
Q Okay So in other words your lawyers are not in position to make
an individualized investigation or adversary presentation about
bond?
A Because they don 'thave enough lawyers orresources.'
2
In what type of criminal justice does a lawyer feel that interviews
of new arrestees are "not allowed?" Perhaps systemic factors,
unrelated to the public defender's office, also explain the abandonment
of detainees. A close look at the systems involved in arresting,
detaining, processing, and charging the detainees demonstrates that
121. Transcript of the Court Proceeding at 6, 8, 9, State v. Crockett, Case No. 443-180
(La. Crim. Dist. Ct. Orleans Parish Apr. 21, 2006) (testimony of Powell Miller) (transcript on
file with Tulane Law Revieto.
122. Transcript of Habeas Corpus Hearing at 21-23 (La. Crim. Dist. Ct. Orleans Parish
Apr. 13, 2006) (testimony of Tilden Greenbaum) (on file with Tulane Law Revieu).
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perverse incentives fostered the Orleans Parish criminal justice
system's "no charge, no counsel" approach.
The costs associated with the state's failure to provide poor
detainees with precharge counsel are deftly hidden, while the benefits
are widespread and obvious to police, prosecutors, courts, and jailers.
A man went to the Gulf Coast in October of2005, just days aier
the storm. He went with his construction buddies and their boss; they
have come to rebuild New Orleans.
The man is named Pedro Parr-Sanchez.'23 He is a Mexican
citizen and a lawful resident alien residing in the United States with a
valid green card.-2 ' He lives in Bakesfiek California, with his wife
and four children. He has lived in the United States for twenty years.
On October 13, 2005, New Orleans police arrested Mr Pairs-
Sanchez and chaiged him with battey.'26 He is forty-four years old
and has never before been charged with a crime. None of the courts
are open and the local jail is flooded'27
The police handcuffed Mr. Pars-Sanchez and took him to an old
Greyhound Bus Station that has been converted to a make-shiftjail'
A piece ofplywood hangs crookedly over the door across it someone
has scrawled WELCOME TOANGOLA SOUTH
Mr Parra-Sanchez waited Court proceeded in a blur of activity
he cannot understand No Spanish interpreter is available, so everyone
in the courtroom manages as best they can: Spanish is made to
suffice. The public defender in the courtroom that day neither met Mr
Parra-Sanchez nor interviewed him about his bail prospects.
Louisiana q Code of Criminal Procedure entitled Mr Parra-
Sanchez to have counsel appointed to represent him from the day of
his initial appeaiance through the resolution of his case.'29
The judge tells Mr Parra-Sanchez that the public defender is his
lawyer for that day only He will get his own lawyer if and when the
prosecution decides to accept the charges against him.'"° Thus, the
123. Laura Maggi, Inmate Lost in System Resurfaces: After 13 Months He Gets Day
in Cour4 TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 29, 2006, at A-i; Simmons, supm note 14.
The following story of Mr. Parra-Sanchez is based on the personal knowledge of the author,
with some details related in the above Tmes-Picayune and Los Angeles Times stories.
124. Simmons, supra note 14.
125. Id.
126. Arrest Filing, State v. Parra Sanchez, Case No. 463-568 (La. Crim. Dist. Ct.
Orleans Parish filed Nov. 15, 2006).
127. Simmons, supa note 14.
128. Id
129. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 230.1 (2003).
130. See discussion supm Part II.A.
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public defender who meets M Parm-Sanchez is not his lawyer at all
The lawyer is just constitutional and statutory window dressing,
allowing the system to place a check mark in the counsel column. The
lawyeris not a true check on the power of the prosecution or the court.
Because Mr Parra-Sanchez is unrepresented no one gathers
information about Mr Paira-Sanchez and his family No one contacts
his wife and children to tell them where he is. No one argues for his
release. The judge knows only that Mr Parra-Sanchez is a Mexican
citizen who is charged with aggravated battery.
The judge sets the bond at $20,000. To secure his release, Mr.
Parra-Sanchez will have to get the unthinkable sum of $2400, in cash,
to a local bail bond company He has no way to reach his family, and
no attorney has offered to contact them.
The Code of Criminal Procedure gives the state an unprecedented
period ofsixty days in which to charge or release Mr Parm-Sanchez'3'
Accordingly, the court sets the case for a status hearing sixty days
later; if the district attorney has not filed a bill of information, the court
Wil order Mr Parra-Sanchez released without any bond obligation.
The clerk is inchiferent to Mr Parra-Sanchez plight He does
not enter Mr Para-Sanchez case into the court docketing system:
neither Mr Parm-Sanchez, case, nor his potential release date appear
on any judicial calendar' 2 Because the public defender is appointed
for intial appearnce only, that lawyer makes no record of Mr Parm-
Sanchez existence. The public defender has no case file for Mr
Parm-Sanchez, no notes about his circumstances, not even a calendar
notation ofMr Parra-Sanchez article 701 release date.
Sixty days come and go, then ninety then one hundred and
twenty No charges are filed No release is ordered No lawyer
petitions the court for M Parra-Sanchez release. Mr Para-Sanchez
is lost
133
More days go by More weeks. Months. Guards move Mr
Parra-Sanchez to a small jail in rural St. Charles Parish. No lawyer
comes to visit Days drag on. Other pisones leave for court
appeanmces. Others return and then leave again for court-for
hearings and conferences, and even for trials. Others never return;
131. LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 701(B) (2003).
132. Maggi, supm note 123. During the weeks and months after Katrina, many brave
and loyal court personnel performed their jobs with honor and accuracy. Several months of
investigating what happened to the lost Katrina prisoners have demonstrated that one clerk,
among the many who served well, simply failed to enter any court data about any case
processed through "Camp Greyhound."
133. Simmons, supa note 14.
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they have been released and sent home or sentenced and remanded to a
state penitentiary in the north. Mr Parra-Sanchez never leaves the jail
Not once.
In early January 2006, someone in the distnict attorney office
notices the Para-Sanchez file."4 The district attomey office accepts
the charges and files a bill of hnformation against him.'" Perhaps the
district attorney office believes Mr Parra-Sanchez is not in jail; under
those circumstances the Code of Criminal Procedure gives the distrct
attorney ninety days to file charges against him.136 No one seems quite
sure.
The bond in the case is suddenly reduced to $15,000, although
nothing in the record suggests that anyone has taken any action on the
case.3  No one tells Mr Parra-Sanchez that the district attorney has
filed a bill of information signaling its intent to prosecute him. No one
tells Ar Parra-Sanchez that his bond has been reduced Of course, the
bond reduction is oflittle use to him now His family has sold his tools
to pay for food and clothing. Afier several months without his income,
the family is behind in the rent and will soon be evicted from their
home.
138
Article 701 of the Code of Criminal Procedure entitles Mr Parra-
Sanchez to an araignment within thirty days of the filing of the bill of
information. According to local pactice, arraignment tiggeis Mr
Parra-Sanchezs nght to counsel He should have an arraignment
within thirty days and counsel should be appointed at that time."'
Motions should be se discovery produce4 a tral scheduled plea
discussion begun. Yet days drag on, then weeks. Nothing changes.
No one from the court or the district attomeys office seems quite
sure whether Mr Parra-Sanchez is in custody or on bond Or perhaps
no one cares. Meanwhile, the public defenders office is inhifferent to
Mr Parra-Sanchez.
As an institution, the public defender office does not know that
Mr Para-Sanchez exists. He was a client for 'winital appearances
only" in October 2005. The public defender never added his name to
its client list, opened a file under his name, or assigned an attorney to
134. Maggi, supra note 123.
135. Bill of Information Filing, State v. Parra Sanchez, Case No. 463-568 (La. Crim.
Dist. Ct. Orleans Parish filed Jan. 9, 2006).
136. Id; see also LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 701 (B)(2).
137. Bill of Information Filing, supa note 135.
138. Simmons, supra note 14.
139. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 701(C).
140. Id. art. 701.
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assist him. The public defenders calendaring system has no mention
of him. In the view of this chronically underfunde4 juicially
controlled public defender system, Mh Parra-Sanchez will become a
public defender problem if and when he s produced in a section of
court and assigned to the section defender
So, as January turns into February, February into March, and
March into April, Mi: Parra-Sanchez continues to sit in the St. Charles
Parish jail He sees the jail psychiatist, implores her for help she
cannot help him unless his case goes to court.'' He begs the guards.
"Will Ihave a court date? When? When can Igo home?" They are
kind but they cannot help him.' 2  Thousands of Orleans Parish
prsoners are scattered across the state asking the same questions to
similar guards in similar prisons. The answer is always the same. A
shrug and a brief explanation that they cannot do anything until the
court sends for him. Mr Parra-Sanchez makes a few friends in jail.
They share with him the little they know about Louisiana criminal
procedure. Those who speak English help him file two pro se motions
for a speedy trial.
In May 2006, the Parra-Sanchez case appeared on the docket in a
crminal distict court 3  The case is set for amraignment: the
appointment of counsel and the entry ofa preliminary plea of '"gOity"
or "'not guilty" No one calls St. Charles Parish jail and tells Mr Parra-
Sanchez to get ready for a thp to court. No one calls the sheriff to tell
him to bring Mr Parma-Sanchez to court. No one tells the public
defenders office about a new case on the calendar The arraignment
date arrives. Mr. Parm-Sanchez is in the St. Charles Parish jail. The
judge orders his deputy to call Mr. Parra-Sanchezs name three times
in the hall. No response. The judge issues an arrest warrant based on
Mr Pai-Sanchezs willful failure to appear in court'" This warrant
for failure to appear will appear on any future court records or criminal
history records. Mr Parm-Sanchez knows none of this. He is still in
jail. No new court date is set.
May, June, July, August, September, and October pass in the
same way for Mr Parm-Sanchez He is in a small jail, in a small town
in southeastern Louisiana. He misses his children and his wife. He
141. Simmons, supr note 14.
142. Id.
143. Arraignment Set, State v. Parra Sanchez, Case No. 463-568 (La. Crim. Dist. Ct.
Orleans Parish May 1,2006).
144. Order for Failure To Appear, Parra Sanchez, Case No. 463-568 (filed May 11,
2006).
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has afready missed Thanksgiving, Clznstmas, New Years, and Easter
His family has moved into an RVpark.'45 His eldest daughter has run
away from home to live with her boyfriend; her struggling mother
could not support all four children.'46  Mr Parm-Sanchez can do
nothing He has no lawyer He has never been to court Independence
Day comes and goes. Columbus Day, Halloween, and Vetemn s Day
More than one yearhas passed
In November 2006, someone calls the Tulane Law Climc asking
about Pedro Para-Sanchez My students and I file a habeas petition
for his release and move to dismiss the charges filed against him for
violation of his consitutional right to a speedy trial'47 He is released
in mid-November, 2006.148
C Otherlnstitutionalnterests
When the police arrest a suspect, the initial institutional costs
associated with the arrest begin and end within the relatively short
period of time required to complete booking forms and transport the
arrestee to a place of detention. Yet the police acquire individual and
institutional benefits that survive for the entire period of the arrestee's
detention and beyond. Institutionally, each person who is incarcerated,
whether guilty or innocent, is another incapacitated potential law
breaker. Absent the rare public backlash against unmerited or biased
arrests, police departments benefit from the detention of suspects.
Individual police officers also incur short-term costs and long-
term benefits from the detention of arrestees. The costs are those
associated with initial arrest procedures (i.e., booking the prisoner,
writing a police report, transporting the prisoner according to local
practices) and those associated with increasingly rare case
adjudications, appearance at motion hearings, and the increasingly rare
trial.
Yet, the benefit for officers may be incalculable. First, as noted
above, regardless of a suspect's guilt or innocence, each arrest
represents the incapacitation of a potential lawbreaker. Second, each
arrest is another chit credited to an officer's personal record and to the
statistics maintained on that officer's division or unit. Third, each
arrest creates a potential ally, a suspect turned state's witness, who can
145. Simmons, supranote 14.
146. Id.
147. Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Parr-Sanchez, Case No. 463-568 (filed
Nov. 17, 2006).
148. Release Issued, Parm-Sanchez, Case No. 463-568 (Nov. 17, 2006).
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help police effect more law enforcement and more arrests, with less
police-generated investigative work."9
The prosecutor enjoys a similarly high-benefit to low-cost ratio
when the state fails to provide precharge detainees with counsel. As an
elected official, the district attorney has a powerful political incentive
to reduce crime rates. Every person incarcerated represents another
potential crime uncommitted. Absent meaningful assistance of
counsel during the precharge period, a defendant is less likely to be
released on bond.
This increased ability to incapacitate uncharged potential
offenders has no cost for the prosecutor; the district attorney neither
pays for, nor is held accountable to explain, the number of nights that a
suspect remains in jail without any formal charges pending.
The length of the screening period, sixty days for a felony, serves
as a disincentive for swift screening of cases and the prompt release of
suspects when circumstances indicate that no conviction will be
obtained. "' At worst, the district attorney endures occasional bad press
for incarcerating and then failing to prosecute some unfortunate
individuals. At best, the district attorney maximizes the opportunity to
prevent new offenses while simultaneously obtaining a significant
advantage in investigation and case preparation.
Finally, there are no legal disincentives for the prolonged
incarceration of precharge suspects. If a suspect is unlawfully deprived
of counsel, suppression of any resulting statements may be required.''
But absent a formal charge, there is no unconstitutional deprivation of
counsel, so that remedy is illusory and its deterrent power negligible.
Prosecutors enjoy unparalleled immunity for charging decisions.
Absent some self-executing speedy trial statute, such as the Speedy
Trial Act,' unrepresented suspects are limited to pursuing the
149. Incarceration serves as a powerful inducement for suspects to cooperate with law
enforcement by providing information about ongoing criminal activity. Since the federal
government's formalization of cooperation benefits, many states have followed suit. See
Ross Galin, Note, Above the Law: The Prosecutor Duty To Seek Justice and the
Performance of Substantial Assistance Agreements, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1245, 1251-52
(2000). Criminal defense practitioners generally agree that, while cooperation still carries a
stigma, that stigma has decreased as the benefits of cooperation have become more and more
apparent. See Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REv. 563, 563-
65 (1999).
150. See LA. CODE CRM. PROC. ANN. art. 701 (2003).
151. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,473-75 (1966).




extraordinary relief available under the Speedy Trial Clause of the
Sixth Amendment.' 3
In the best of circumstances, a jailer would be neutral as to the
consequences of unrepresented precharge detention. However, in New
Orleans, the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff's office has historically
had a tremendous financial interest in maximizing the number of
persons it incarcerates."
The costs of incarceration do not deter police and prosecutors
from unnecessary arrests or unwarranted pretrial detention. It is the
City of New Orleans that pays for the incarceration of pretrial
detainees, currently at the rate of $22.39 per night.'5 City government
is unlikely to discourage its police from making arrests. As to the
length of precharge incarceration, that is a matter solely within the
control of the district attorney.'56
The judicial officers, who preside over initial appearances, should
be neutral and detached. The reality, however, is that the elected
magistrate answers to the public-no elected judge wants to see his or
her name attached to the headline: "Suspect Strikes Again Only Days
After Release By Judge X." The appointed commissioners, who serve
at the whim of the local judges, have far more immediate concerns
than those of the elected magistrates. The magistrate runs for office
once every six years.'5' In contrast, the commissioners have no ability
even to predict when the judges might reevaluate their employment.
And why has the Louisiana legislature permitted this subversion
of the adversary system? The stock answer is a simple one: no one
ever got elected by voting for more money for criminal defense. Yet,
153. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-36 (1972). A
key factor in evaluating the merits of a constitutional speedy-trial claim is evidence of the
prejudice caused to the defendant's case by the delay in proceedings. Id at 530-33.
Assuming a suspect can allege the necessary delay, the prolonged period of incarceration,
without assistance of counsel, renders it impossible to say with certainty whether and to what
extent the passage of time has caused actual prejudice to the defendant's ability to assemble a
defense. Id. How can an unrepresented Katrina detainee demonstrate such harm? Because
no lawyer investigated the case before Katrina, it is virtually impossible to show how Katrina
altered the available defenses.
154. See ROD AMIS, KATRINA AND THE LOST CITY OF NEW ORLEANS 110 (2005).
155. Interview with Brian Firstly, New Orleans Chief Administrative Office, in New
Orleans, La. (Feb. 16, 2007).
156. The city attorney does prosecute municipal offenses and there are significant
costs to the City of New Orleans associated with those prosecutions. HOME RULE CHARTER
OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS § 4-401 (1996), available at http://www.cityofno.com/portal.
aspx?tabid-9. However, as noted elsewhere, a critique of the municipal offense system is
beyond the scope of this Article. See discussion supra note 163.
157. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 51(D); LA REv STAT. ANN. § 13:1346(A)(1).
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in Louisiana, that need not be so. By law, all first time felons are
eligible for full restoration of rights.' While most reentering
offenders fail to pursue restoration, that is a function of ignorance and
expense-many ex-offenders are unaware of their restoration rights,
and, in Orleans Parish, it costs $125 to obtain an expungement.'59
Ultimately, silent system-wide incentives discourage the early
appointment of counsel. Appointed counsel is by far the most frequent
adversary match for the prosecutor. Accordingly, the weight of the
criminal justice system tends naturally to postpone, as far as is
possible, that adversary's entry into the criminal justice fray. After all,
adversary procedures are the most labor-intensive, expensive, and
time-consuming aspects of criminal procedure. When the right to




While no one solution will resolve the chronic underfunding of
public defense or the judicial underenforcement of criminal practice
norms, my struggle for answers about the uncharged Katrina detainees
has led me far from my early views about the right to counsel. Where
I once urged flexibility and substantive inquiry, I now know better.
In an earlier article, I argued that the critical-stage doctrine fails
to honor the Sixth Amendment's promise of the right to counsel.'6' As
a result, I urged that the United States Supreme Court should adopt a
more flexible approach to the attachment of the counsel guarantee.'62
Katrina proved me right about the problem, but wrong about the
solution. Application of the bright-line, critical-stage doctrine left
hundreds of uncharged pretrial detainees without any assistance of
counsel at a time when, without counsel's assistance, their fundamental
rights were irretrievably lost.'63
158. LA. REV. STAT.ANN. § 44:9 (Supp. 2007).
159. LA. RE. STAT. ANN. § 15:572(B) (2003).
160. For a more extended discussion of systemic impulses toward suppression of
adversary procedures, see Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV.
475,477, 480-81 (2006).
161. See Metzger, supmnote 94, at 1636-37.
162. Id at 1689-90.
163. Id. at 1662-71. My examples are restricted to the criminal district court; although
worthy of an article in its own right, the dilemma of the municipal defendant, charged with a
petty offense, is beyond the scope of this Article.
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Katrina taught me that bright lines are the best lines of defense
for the poor. When criminal justice resources are scarce, the poor are
most likely to enjoy those constitutional rights that are enforced as
bright-line, black-letter, categorical imperatives. Criminal justice
systems honor concrete rules more readily than abstract imperatives,
particularly when institutions of power are pitted against pools of
nonvoters.
After Katrina, the criminal justice systems of New Orleans
defaulted to formal and pro forma compliance with those
constitutional rules that are clear, bright-line "thou shalt" and "thou
shalt not" imperatives. For example, the criminal justice system
quickly complied with the forty-eight-hour, County of Riverside v
McLaughlin rule, ensuring that a neutral and detached magistrate
reviewed the facts for each warrantless arrest and honored the clear
imperative that a defendant have the assistance of counsel at
arraignment." Compliance with these constitutional mandates was
overwhelmingly thorough.'65  Within forty-eight hours of their
respective arrests, a neutral and detached magistrate reviewed each
defendant's arrest for probable cause."M  Even during mass
arraignments at prisons outside the New Orleans metropolitan area,
each defendant had a public defender standing by his or her side to
waive reading of the charges and enter a not guilty plea.'
Thus, after Katrina, the surviving institutions of criminal justice,
whether deliberately or subconsciously, took stock of the rights the
Supreme Court extended to pretrial detainees, and then provided those
rights, to the letter of the law (but not one step beyond). Why were the
Orleans Parish precharge detainees without counsel? Because the
institutions of criminal procedure believed that precharge detainees
could be detained without counsel and without consequences to those
empowered to detain them.
Katrina helped me understand that the right to counsel requires a
bright line, but a different one than that drawn by the critical-stage
doctrine. Where should the line be drawn? Katrina taught me lessons
about that as well.
First, Katrina reminded me that lawyers, even bad lawyers, matter
in the simplest but most profound ways. Inside the post-Katrina prison
164. Garrett & Tetlow, supm note 1, at 145-53 (discussing the Orleans Parish judicial
response to Katrina); see County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991).
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system, those who lacked lawyers were lost.'68 Only when a lawyer is
personally responsible for representing a named and known defendant
can we expect someone with the power to affect legal proceedings will
use that power to prevent that defendant from disappearing without a
trace.
Second, Katrina proved to me that appointment of counsel at
arraignment is categorically and unequivocally too late. Poor people
detained on criminal charges need the assistance of counsel from the
moment of their arrest. Two days later, or two hours later, can be too
late. Once a suspect disappears into the bowels of the prison system,
that suspect can disappear forever unless a lawyer is personally
responsible for safeguarding that suspect's fate.
I will not pretend to offer fully developed constitutional theory
about why the right to counsel attaches upon arrest. Some scholars
have urged a merging of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel. 9  Others have posited that the Supreme Court's recent
recommitment to an originalist view of the Sixth Amendment requires
a return to a Fifth Amendment due process-based right to counsel.'7 °
For myself, sixteen months after Katrina, the daily deluge of
criminal chaos cautions me against too hastily seeking a single
constitutional theory to solve a practical problem. The Supreme
Court's recent and radical revisiting of its Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence, albeit in the context of the Confrontation Clause,
suggests that constitutional rules and rhetoric are poised to change
again.' And having been once bitten by the unwarranted certainty of
my constitutional theorizing, I am twice shy about too quickly
pretending to devise a solution about a problem so pressing and so
important.
What I can offer is a pragmatic vision about how our criminal
justice systems can provide a right to counsel at arrest and some
educational observations about how a counsel-upon-arrest rule would
168. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 3.
169. See, e.g., Daniel C. Nester, Distinguishing Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights to
Counsel During Police Questioning, 16 S. ILL. L.J. 101, 104 (1991) (arguing the right to
counsel in the pretrial setting under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments should be merged).
170. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Justice Harlan on Criminal Procedure: Two Cheers
for the Legal Process School, 3 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 125, 140 (2005) (discussing Fifth
Amendment due process in the context of the right to counsel).
171. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004). For an excellent and
thorough consideration of the right-to-counsel consequences of the line of cases decided prior
to Crawford see Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure:
Dickerson, Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-but-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1, 12-25 (2001).
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benefit the entire criminal justice system. In New Orleans at the end
of 2006, Katrina has validated Escobedo's long-abandoned premise:
the right to counsel should attach upon arrest and must continue until
charges are dismissed or the case is resolved. As the dissenting
justices feared after Escobedo, a bright-line, counsel-upon-arrest rule
will create new entitlements and require new means for enforcing
them.'72 Yet, the plight of the uncharged Katrina detainees in itself
makes a persuasive case for earlier representation for all arrestees.
All defendants should have access to assigned counsel from the
earliest practicable moment after they enter police custody. This
counsel need not be physically present at the station house. Those with
retained counsel can call that counsel. Those without counsel, and
those too poor to afford counsel, should have access to an on-call
public defender, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. That
public defender would consult with arrestees and take responsibility
for ensuring that their fundamental rights are vindicated.
At a later point, a court or public defender would still make an
indigency determination. Those able to retain private counsel would
be instructed to do so. Because the vast majority of criminal
defendants are indigent, there is likely to be little waste or unnecessary
expense in offering assistance to those who are unable to reach
retained counsel at the moment of arrest.'73
In the early twenty-first century, providing access to counsel upon
arrest is a readily accomplishable goal. Indeed, in Vermont and
Minnesota, persons accused of drunk driving already have a right to
counsel upon arrest.'4 Those with private counsel are entitled, as a
matter of law, to call their counsel.' Those without means, or those
whose counsel is unavailable, are provided with access to a public
defender via a call-in line that provides telephone counsel twenty-four
hours a day, seven days a week.'76
Early provision of access to counsel serves all of the fundamental
goals of criminal procedure. While scholars and lawyers may disagree
about the foremost goals of criminal procedure, there is a general
172. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 499 (1964) (White, J., dissenting) (noting
concern for the majority decision's effect on law enforcement efforts).
173. See Ahmed A. White, The Jundical Structure of Habitual Offender Laws and the
Juisprudence of Authoritatian Social Control, 37 U. TOL. L. REv. 705, 741 n.164 (2006)
(noting that the "majority of criminal defendants" utilize public defender services).
174. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 481.10 (West 2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1202(c) (Supp.
2003).
175. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 481.10; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1202(c).
176. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 481.10; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1202(o.
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consensus that criminal procedures should legitimate the system
sufficiently to ensure continued public confidence in, and acceptance
of, the criminal justice outcomes.'77
In Vermont, an arrested, but uncharged, drunk driver can talk to a
lawyer before deciding whether to exhale.7 8  Surely all criminal
suspects should be entitled to have a lawyer know their names, before
they disappear into prison to await formal charging. Surely people
charged with serious felonies and capital crimes should be entitled to
have someone investigate their cases immediately, before the evidence
has disappeared or the witnesses have vanished. What criminal justice
goals do we value if we come to any other conclusion about the
necessity of counsel at the time of arrest?
As they did when the Court issued its Mimda holding, critics
and naysayers will no doubt object that such a counsel-upon-arrest rule
will deprive law enforcement of a valuable investigative tool: post-
arrest confessions.'79 The Afimnda critics were wrong. Indeed, to the
chagrin of prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers everywhere,
defendants continue to confess, early, often, and inaccurately.' Often,
they confess in stages, revealing small truths here, larger truths there.
The end result for law enforcement is often that the incomplete and
inaccurate statement produces an incomplete and inaccurate
investigation. The end result for the defendant is the lost opportunity
to strike a good bargain with other side: a clean confession and some
good leads in exchange for a better deal.
There is no reason to believe that a right to counsel at arrest will
result in fewer post-arrest statements. Indeed, in a world in which
cooperation with law enforcement is an increasingly popular
negotiating tactic, early advice from counsel might well be intended to
encourage a prompt and complete confession.
Experienced prosecutors and defense attorneys alike recognize
that half-hearted confessions that omit some facts and shade others are
rarely best for prosecutors or defendants. As federal prosecutors and
177. See, e.g., Anup Malani, Habeas Settlements, 92 VA. L. REV. 1, 45 (2006) (noting
that the "policing of criminal procedure" should "prevent erosion" of the public's confidence
in the justice system).
178. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1202(c).
179. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, All Benelts, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of
Miranda fDefenders, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1084, 1093-97 (1996) (providing statistical criticism
of M-anda); William J. Stuntz, Mirandak Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 978-80 (2001)
(arguing that Mianda has limited effective police interrogation).
180. Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First
Centnuy, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1000, 1004 (2001) (noting a ten percent increase in confession
rates after Mianda).
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agents can surely attest, counseled statements are more accurate and
provide better long-term results in investigating and prosecuting those
named as co-conspirators in the confession. Provision of counsel,
upon arrest, will help insure the accuracy and completeness of station
house confessions, thereby improving the accuracy and efficiency of
police investigations.
In addition, a counsel-upon-arrest rule will yield earlier case
resolutions, thereby saving scarce criminal justice resources. Certainly,
some prosecutor's offices have come to favor prescreening case
resolution over postscreening resolution because of the efficiencies
earned by such a system.'
Earlier appointment of counsel will also lead to better judicial
determinations about pretrial release. There is strong empirical
evidence that "delaying representation until after the pretrial release
determination" is the most significant cause of "lengthy pretrial
incarceration of people charged with nonviolent crimes."' 82 In part, this
reflects the significant effect an advocate can have upon judicial
decisions: "Without counsel present, judicial officers [make] less
informed decisions and [are] more likely to set or maintain a pretrial
release financial condition that [is] beyond the individual's ability to
pay."18
3
In short, assignment of counsel upon arrest will likely benefit the
entire criminal justice system. But even if its only benefit is to prevent
the abandonment of precharge detainees, that benefit would be
enough.
B. Lawyeiing Lessons
So, Katrina taught me about bright lines. But there should be no
confusion: Katrina, for all her power, neither created Louisiana's right-
to-counsel catastrophe nor caused the resulting constitutional crisis.
Katrina simply ripped away the scrim, exposing the system's long-
standing failures.
Indeed, many of my Katrina stories are not really Katrina stories
at all. They are pre-Katrina stories: stories about rights' failures that
181. SeeWright & Miller, supra note 92, at 58-66 (discussing the prescreening process
in the New Orleans district attorney's office).
182. Colbert et al., supra note 74, at 1720. Of course, as Katrina demonstrated,
appointed counsel upon arrest deters excessive pretrial incarceration simply by providing a
detainee with an advocate who can count and who can say: "My client is in jail and has been
for more than sixty days; he has not been charged; therefore, he must be released."
183. Id.
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were already complete long before Katrina approached the Gulf Coast.
Katrina simply magnified systemic flaws and exposed systemic
failures. Katrina proved that the old liberal saw: "The personal is
political" can be as aptly turned into a criminal justice axiom:
"Individual wrongs reflect institutional failures."
I learned other lessons from Katrina. For what it is worth, I share
one more: a lesson about being a lawyer who represents poor people.
Good lawyering on behalf of poor people can bring joy in the
midst of despair. Truly, I had days that were filled with pure joy.
Once, I met a man who had not seen or heard from his family in the
more than seven months that he had been in jail. Within two days, our
clinic had him safely home. It felt magnificent, powerful, humbling,
and almost biblically just.
There were days when our small band of lawyers and students
had a cause so just and so righteous that we felt a mystical thrill
standing in court uttering the incantations of freedom: due process,
fundamental fairness, and habeas corpus. There were days when
students lined up, one after the other, in a line extending out of the
courtroom, well beyond the audience, nearly to the hall, for a lightning
round of habeas arguments to be made before the temporary
courthouse closed for the day.
There were swaggering, podium-pounding days of joy, moments
when row upon row of men, chained together in orange prison
jumpsuits, leaned forward and burst into spontaneous applause when a
judge ordered one of their number back to freedom.
Those days of joy were, in truth, few and far between. But those
days have lingered long in my memory. Those days made sense of the
countless hours we spent kneeling in front of boxes full of charging
papers and jail lists searching for unknown, uncharged, and
unrepresented detainees. Those days lent a leavening sense of hope
that sustained us through the mind-numbing process of referencing,
cross-referencing, and referencing again, prisoner names against
birthdates and dates of arrest against charging deadlines.
Those days inspired whatever merit this Article has. Katrina gave
me those days, and Katrina gave me that joy. Katrina reminded me
that having a lawyer matters and being a lawyer matters.
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